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NOTES & COMMENTS
CRIMINAL LAW-WHOSE HEAD Is IN THE SAND?

PROBLEMS

WITH THE USE OF THE OSTRICH INSTRUCTION IN CONSPIRACY
CASES

INTRODUCTION

You may infer knowledge from a combination of suspicion and
indifference to the truth. If you find that a person had a strong
suspicion that things were not what they seemed or that someone
had withheld some important facts, yet shut his eyes for fear of
what he would learn, you may conclude that he acted knowingly
I

The preceding is an example of a jury instruction given with in
creasing frequency in criminal cases in which the defendant's guilty
knowledge is at issue. This instruction has several names, the most
colorful of which is the Seventh Circuit's term, the "ostrich
instruction. "2
The courts have used the instruction in a wide variety of contexts,
including mail fraud, 3 importation and possession of narcotics, 4 aiding
and abetting of the misapplication of federally insured funds, s aiding
and abetting the escape of a federal prisoner, 6 and recently, in conspir
acy cases. 7 This Comment will focus on the propriety of the instruc
1. United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
2075 (1989).
2. See, e.g., id.; United States v. Holland, 831 F.2d 717, 722 (7th Cir. 1987); United
States v. Ramsey, 785 F.2d 184, 189 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1186 (1986). Other
courts have their own names for the instruction. See, e.g., United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d
697, 703 (9th Cir.) (en bane) ("deliberate ignorance"), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976);
United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 288 (2d Cir.) ("conscious avoidance"), cert. denied,
414 U.S. 821 (1973).
3. Ramsey, 785 F.2d at 185.
4. United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524, 527-29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 935 (1978).
5. Holland, 831 F.2d at 722.
6. United States v. Nordstrom, 730 F.2d 556, 557 (8th Cir. 1984).
7. United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 1988) (sustaining district
court's use of the instruction), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2075 (1989); United States v. Kehm,
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tion in conspiracy prosecutions in cases in which the defendant argues
that he or she was not a member of the conspiracy. The Seventh Cir
cuit allows the use of the instruction in such cases;8 the Second Circuit
forbids it. 9
In United States v. Diaz,1O the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed a conviction for conspiracy in a case in which the district
court judge gave an ostrich instruction, II although the defendant ar
gued that he was not a member of the conspiracy.12 In its decision,
the court criticized the decision of the Second Circuit in a similar case,
United States v. Mankani.13 In Mankani, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the conscious avoidance theory of criminal knowl
edge, which is the basis for the ostrich instruction, cannot be used in a
case in which the defendant's membership in the conspiracy is in
dispute. 14
The Diaz ls and Mankani 16 decisions demonstrate the differences
between the two approaches, and the different results which may fol
low. The purpose of this Comment is to explore the reasoning behind
the two approaches, and discuss how one court decided that the use of
the ostrich instruc;tion in certain conspiracy cases is nonsensical given
the mens rea for conspiracy, while the other court chose to allow
broad use of the instruction in conspiracy cases. The Comment also
analyzes the implications of these differing views for a defendant who
argues that he or she has never joined the alleged conspiracy. Section
I focuses on the provision of the Model Penal Code which provides the
basis for the ostrich instruction,17 and traces the Supreme Court's use
799 F.2d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1986) (sustaining the district court's use of the instruction);
United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 547 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984) (reversing district court,
and forbidding use of the instruction in connection with membership in the conspiracy).
8. Diaz, 864 F.2d at 549.
9. Mankani, 738 F.2d at 547. The other circuits have yet to hear this issue, and the
Supreme Court has thus far never granted certiorari in a case involving the ostrich instruc
tion and membership in a conspiracy.
10. 864 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2075 (1989).
11. Id. at 551.
12. Id. at 550-51.
13. 738 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1984) (criticized in Diaz, 864 F.2d at 549).
14. Id. at 547 & n.1. Mankani was distinguished in United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d
1015, 1021-22 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861 (1986) and United States v. Reed, 790
F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 954 (1986). In both of these cases, the
defendant admitted that he was a member of the group charged with conspiracy, but ar
gued that he was ignorant of the group's illegal activity.
15. 864 F.2d 544.
16. 738 F.2d 538.
17. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(7) (1985). See infra note 21 for the text of
§ 2.02(7).
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of this definition in the late 1960s and early 1970s. 18 Section I con
cludes with a discussion of the development of jury instructions based
on equating conscious avoidance of knowledge with actual knowl
edge. 19 Section II explores the substantive law of conspiracy, focusing
on the mens rea element. Section III discusses United States v. Diaz
and United States v. Mankani, two cases which deal with the applica
bility of the theory behind the ostrich instruction to a situation in
which membership in a conspiracy is at issue and the differences be
tween the two approaches. Section IV analyzes the two approaches in
light of the mens rea for conspiracy, certain procedural aspects of con
spiracy trials and certain policy issues. Section IV also suggests that
courts give an instruction which clarifies the mens rea for conspiracy if
they give an ostrich instruction in connection with a defendant's mem
bership in a conspiracy.
I.

A.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE OSTRICH INSTRUCTION

MODEL PENAL CODE

§ 2.02(7)

In response to the inconsistent penal codes in force in many
states, the American Legal Institute began drafting the Model Penal
Code ("M.P.C.") in the late 1950s. 20 Among its general definitions of
types of culpability, the M.P.C. included a provision equating deliber
ate ignorance with knowledge. 21 In adopting this approach, the
M.P.C. followed a common law tradition equating deliberate avoid
ance of knowledge with actual knowledge. 22
18. Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416-17 (1970) (affirming a finding of
knowledge based on deliberate ignorance, citing MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(7) (proposed
Official Draft, 1962) and Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6, 46 (1969»; Leary v. United
States, 395 U.S. 6,46 (1969) (citing MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(7) as a valid definition of
criminal knowledge, and holding that the government had not proved deliberate avoid
ance). See infra notes 23-32 for a discussion of Leary and Turner.
19. See, e.g., United States v. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524,527-29 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 935 (1978); United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 287-88 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973); United States v. Squires, 440 F.2d 859, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1971).
20. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 1.02 commentary at 14-15 (1985); Goodrich, Foreword
to MODEL PENAL CoDE at vii-viii (proposed Official Code 1962).
21. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(7) (1985). The section provides, U[w)hen knowl
edge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is
established if a person is aware of a high probability of its existence, unless he actually
believes that it does not exist."
22. Robbins, The Ostrich Instruction: Deliberate Ignorance as a Criminal Mens Rea,
81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 191, 196-203 (1990).
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Early Supreme Court Cases Applying MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 2.02(7): Leary v. United States 23 and Turner v. United
States 24

In 1969, the Supreme Court, citing the M.P.C., adopted the delib
erate ignorance definition of knowledge in Leary v. United States. 25
While in possession of a small amount of marijuana, the defendant in
Leary drove from New York to Mexico with his son and daughter. 26
The prosecution argued that the defendant deliberately avoided learn
ing that the marijuana he carried was produced outside the United
States, and that by bringing it across the border into Mexico and back,
he was guilty of smuggling. 27 On the issue of deliberate ignorance, the
prosecution argued that the possession of marijuana proved that the
defendant had the guilty knowledge necessary to sustain a conviction
for the more serious crime of smuggling because only deliberate avoid
ance of knowledge could have kept the defendant ignorant of the for
eign source of the narcotics he possessed. 28 The Court, while
endorsing the equation of deliberate ignorance with knowledge, found
that the prosecution had not proved that the defendant had deliber
ately avoided learning that the marijuana he possessed had been pro
duced outside the United States. 29 The prosecution failed to establish
that the marijuana in the defendant's possession was obviously not
grown in the United States. 3D
One year later, in Turner v. United States,3l the Court held that
the prosecution's proof that the defendant had engaged in heroin and
cocaine trafficking also satisfied the knowledge requirement of the
smuggling statute. The Court stated that mere common sense would
have led to the knowledge that the heroin came from a foreign source,
unless the trafficker was deliberately ignorant. The prosecution suc
cessfully argued that anyone engaged in heroin trafficking must know
that the source of that heroin was foreign, unless the trafficker deliber
ately avoided this knowledge. The Court held that, since little or no
heroin was manufactured in the United States, and the defendant did
not explain his ignorance as to the source of the heroin, a finding of
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

30.
31.

395 u.s. 6 (1969).
396 u.S. 398 (1970).
395 U.S. at 46 & n.93.
Id. at 9.
Id. at 46.
Id.
Id.
Id.
396 U.S. 398,416·17 (1970).
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deliberate ignorance, and therefore knowledge, was proper. 32 Thus,
by 1970, the Supreme Court had acknowledged the validity of equat
ing deliberate ignorance with guilty knowledge.
C.

The Courts ofAppeals Take the Next Step: Jury Instructions
Based on Equating Deliberate Ignorance With Knowledge

While Leary and Turner did not focus on jury instructions based
on conscious ignorance, the federal courts of appeals drew the infer
ence that an instruction based on equating deliberate ignorance with
knowledge was acceptable, and began to uphold such instructions in
some situations during the 19708. 33 While the Second Circuit was the
first to uphold a deliberate ignorance instruction, it soon had company
in its approval of the instruction. By the late 19708, nearly all of the
circuits allowed the instruction in some contexts. 34 Some courts were
more cautious about the content and use of the instruction than
others. For example, the Ninth Circuit, concerned about both context
and content, was reluctant to approve of the instruction. 35 Still, most
of the courts of appeals have accepted the argument that the Supreme
Court's use of the M.P.C.'s definition of knowledge 36 indicates that an
32. Id. In Turner, narcotics agents stopped the car in which the defendant was a
passenger and retrieved several packages he had discarded. One of the packages contained
a mixture of heroin and powder. Id. at 401, 416-18.
33. The Second Circuit, which has since been cautious in its use of the ostrich in
struction, was the first to allow an instruction based on MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2.02(7). In
United States v. Squires, the Second Circuit adopted the definition of knowledge in 2.02(7)
and approved a jury instruction based on conscious avoidance, but reversed the conviction
on other grounds. 440 F.2d 859, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1971). Two years later, the Second Cir
cuit sustained a conviction based upon an ostrich instruction in a case concerning the pos
session of stolen currency. United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 287-88 (2d Cir.), cen.
denied, 414 U.S. 821 (1973).
34. See generally 1 DEVITI & BLACKMAR, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND IN
STRUCTIONS (3d ed. 1977 & Supp. 1990), which states that some form of the ostrich in
struction is allowed in all circuits except the 4th and 6th. See. e.g., United States v. Kehm,
799 F.2d 354, 362 (7th Cir. 1986); United States v. Nordstrom, 730 F.2d 556, 557 (8th Cir.
1984); United States v. Brien, 617 F.2d 299, 312 (1st Cir.), cert. denied. 446 U.S. 919
(1980); United States V. Restrepo-Granda, 575 F.2d 524,527-29 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439
U.S. 935 (1978); United States V. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697, 702-04 (9th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 426 U.S. 951 (1976); United States V. Squires, 440 F.2d 859, 863-64 (2d Cir. 1971).
35. The Ninth Circuit, concerned that the instruction could lead to the substitution
of negligence for knowledge as the level of mens rea the prosecution must prove for certain
crimes, has suggested specific wording, and actively advocated cautious use of the instruc
tion. See. e.g., United States V. Alvarado, 838 F.2d 311, 314-15 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. de
nied, 487 U.S. 1222 (1988); Jewell, 532 F.2d at 702-04. For a discussion of the Ninth
Circuit's use of the instruction in general, see Note, United States V. Alvarado: Reflections
on a Jewell, 19 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 47 (1989).
36. Turner V. United States, 396 U.S. 398, 416-17 & n.29 (1970) (quoting MODEL
PENAL CoDE § 2.02(7»; Leary, 395 U.S. at 46 n.93 (also quoting MODEL PENAL CODE
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instruction based on conscious ignorance is permissible. The instruc
tion allows a prosecutor to make use of the inferences which can be
drawn from a defendant's avoidance of knowledge of certain facts. By
equating such deliberate ignorance with knowledge, a prosecutor may
convict a criminal who is benefiting from criminal activity but has in
sulated himself from the actual commission of a crime.
More recently, the Second and Seventh Circuits have allowed the
use of the instruction in conspiracy prosecutions,37 although the two
courts disagree about how and when the instruction can be given in
such cases. Much of the disagreement centers on the mens rea for
conspiracy and the appropriateness of the ostrich instruction in light
of the requisite mens rea. In order to evaluate the two approaches and
consider alternatives, it is necessary to focus on the substantive law of
conspiracy, particularly the mens rea element.

II.

THE MODERN LAW OF CONSPIRACY

Like all crimes, conspiracy is comprised of an act and an accom
panying mental state, the mens rea. 38 The agreement on a criminal
objective is the act; the required mental state is the topic of some de
bate. In their treatise on criminal law, Wayne LaFave and Austin
Scott state that the mens rea for conspiracy is "the purpose of achiev
ing a certain result."39 The M.P.C., in accord with LaFave and Scott,
defines conspiracy as follows:
(1) Definition of Conspiracy. A person is guilty of conspiracy with

another person or persons to commit a crime if with the purpose of
promoting or facilitating its commission he:
(a) agrees with such other person or persons that they or one
or more of them will engage in conduct that constitutes such crime
or an attempt or solicitation to commit such crime; or
(b) agrees to aid such other person or persons in the planning
or commission of such crime or of an attempt or solicitation to com
§ 2.02(7». For a discussion of the Court's use of the M.P.C. definition, see supra notes 25
32 and accompanying text.
37. United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 551 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
2075 (1989) (membership in conspiracy to possess and distribute narcotics); Kehm, 799
F.2d at 362 (knowledge of criminal nature of a conspiracy to smuggle narcotics into the
United States); United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1023 (2d Cir.) (knowledge of specific
acts committed by the conspiracy), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861 (1986); United States V. Reed,
790 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.) (knowledge of specific acts committed by the conspiracy), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 954 (1986).
38. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW § 6.4(e) (2d ed. 1986).

39.

Id.
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mit such crime. 40

Several other commentators agree that the mens rea for conspiracy is
purpose, that is, a specific desire to further the criminal enterprise.41
Most states have explicitly adopted the mens rea of purpose for
conspiracy,.either by statute or by judicial fiat,42 although a handful of
state statutes either require a different mens rea requirement or are
ambiguous on the subject. 43 Although no federal statute explicitly
prescribes a level of mens rea for conspiracy, the Supreme Court has,
in several key cases, clearly stated that the mens rea for conspiracy is
intent to further the aims of the conspiracy.44 "Intent" is the
equivalent of purpose under the M.P.C.4s
Because the ostrich instruction equates deliberate ignorance with
knowledge while the mens rea for conspiracy is intent to further the
40. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 5.03(1) (1985) (emphasis added).
·41. See Fridman, Mens Rea in Conspiracy, 19 MOD. L. REv. 276 (1956) (critical
article cited by many courts that require proof of intent to further the criminal enterprise as
the mens rea for conspiracy); Harno, Intent in Criminal Conspiracy, 89 U. PA. L. REv. 624
(1941) (arguing that any mens rea for conspiracy less than intent to further is nonsensical).
42. See McCullough v. State, 40 Ala. App. 309, 113 So. 2d 905, 912, cert. denied,269
Ala. 698, 113 So. 2d 912 (1959); State v. Gunnison, 127 Ariz. 110, 618 P.2d 604 (1980);
Waits v. People, 724 P.2d 1329 (Colo. 1986); State v. Garcia, 102 Idaho 378, 630 P.2d 665
(1981); People v. Mordick, 94 Ill. App. 3d 497,418 N.E.2d 1057 (1981); Huffman v. State,
543 N.E.2d 360 (Ind. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 3257 (1990); State v. Linscott, 520
A.2d 1067 (Me. 1987); State v. St. Christopher, 305 Minn. 226, 232 N.W.2d 798 (1975); see
also ALA. CoDE § 13A-4-3(a) (1982); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-1003(A) (1989); ARK.
CoDE ANN. § 5-3-401 (1987); CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 18-2-201(1) (West 1990); CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 53a-48a (1989); DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 511-513 (1987); HAW. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 705-520 (Michie 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 8-2(a) (Smith-Hurd
1989); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-5-2(a) (West 1986); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 506.040(1)
(MichielBobbs-MerrilI1985); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14:26 (West 1986); ME. REv. STAT.
ANN. tit. 17-A, § 151(1) (1983); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 564.016(1) (Vernon 1979); MONT.
CoDE ANN. § 45-4-102(1) (1989); NEB. REv. STAT. § 28-202 (1989); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 629:3(1) (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-2(a) (West 1982); N.Y. PENAL LAW
§ 105.00-.17 (McKinney 1987); OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. § 2923.01(A) (Anderson 1987);
OR. REv. STAT. ANN. § 161.450 (Butterworth 1990); 18 PA. CoNS. STAT. ANN. § 903
(Purdon 1983); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 15.02(a) (Vernon 1977); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-4-201 (1990); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 9A.28.040(I) (1988); WIS. STAT. ANN.
§ 939.31 (West 1990).
43. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 777.04 (West 1976) (no explicit mens rea); GA. CODE
ANN. § 16-13-33 ·(1988) (no explicit mens rea); IOWA CODE ANN. § 706.1 (West 1979)
(ambiguous mens rea provision); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3302 (1988) (no explicit mens
rea); N.D. CENT. CoDE § 12.1-06-04 (1985) (mens rea of knowledge); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS ANN. § 22-3-8 (1988) (ambiguous mens rea provision); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-22
(1988) (ambiguous mens rea provision).
44. See, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961); Dennis v. United States,
341 U.S. 494 (1951); Hartzel v. United States, 322 U.S. 680 (1944); United States v. Fal
cone, 311 U.S. 205 (1940).
45. MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.13(12) (1985) states: .. 'intentionally' or 'with intent'
means purposely."
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conspiracy, use of the instruction in conspiracy prosecutions presents
a danger that the jury will find a defendant guilty without finding the
requisite mens rea. There is a meaningful difference between purpose
and knowledge. The drafters of the M.P.C. described the difference as
follows: "Knowledge that the requisite external circumstances exist is
a common element in both conceptions. But action is not purposive
with respect to the nature or result of the actor's conduct unless it was
his conscious object to perform an action of that nature or to cause
such a result."46 Thus, in a conspiracy case the prosecution must
show that a defendant knew of the conspiracy and had the purpose of
furthering its aims. If the ostrich instruction is carelessly worded, a
jury could be misled, and improperly find that the defendant's deliber
ate ignorance establishes his intent to further the conspiracy as well as
his knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy. The Second and Sev
enth Circuit Courts of Appeals have responded very differently to this
danger.
III.

Two

ApPROACHES TO THE USE OF THE OSTRICH
INSTRUCTION IN CONSPIRACY CASES

A. A Permissive Approach: United States v. Diaz 47

The defendants in Diaz were charged with conspiracy to possess
and distribute cocaine. 48 The conspiracy had six members, only one of
whom challenged his conviction. 49 On four separate dates, the con
spiracy distributed cocaine. 50 On three of these dates, the conspiracy
sold cocaine to an agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration
("DEA").51 After their arrest, Peirallo, Perez, Rodriguez and Carmen
Diaz pleaded guilty, and the latter three testified as coconspirators at
the trial of Reynaldo Diaz and Jose Pineiro.
The prosecution's case against Reynaldo Diaz was based primar
ily on the testimony of these witnesses. 52 The prosecution acknowl
46. Id. § 2.02 commentary at 233.
47. 864 F.2d 544 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 2075 (1989).
48. Id. at 545.
49. Gerardo Perez, Luis Rodriguez, David Peirallo, Jose Pineiro, Carmen Diaz and
Reynaldo Diaz (no relation to Carmen) were all charged with conspiracy to possess and
distribute cocaine. Id. The ostrich instruction was given in connection with Reynaldo
Diaz. Id. Only Reynaldo Diaz appealed his conviction. Id.
50. Id. The dates were July 23, 1987, August 21, 1987, September 3, 1987, and
September 9, 1987.
51. Id. at 546.
52. Id. The facts of the case are complex. On July 23, Carmen Diaz and Perez sold
cocaine to a DEA agent. The United States brought no evidence that Reynaldo Diaz was
involved in this sale, and Carmen Diaz was not directly involved in the subsequent sales.
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edged that Reynaldo Diaz was not present for any sale but the last. 53
However, Perez testified that one sale took place near Diaz's house so
that Diaz could see the buyer, and that he (perez) dropped the money
off at Diaz's house afterwards. 54 Agents in the neighborhood, how
ever, were unable to confirm the dropoff.55 There was testimony to the
effect that Diaz was to be present for the September 9, 1987 sale of a
kilogram of cocaine to CollinS. 56 Diaz was not present at the sched
uled location for the meeting with Perez and Rodriguez, but phone
records demonstrated that the others called Diaz and spoke with
him. 57 Diaz was convicted in the district court. On appeal, Diaz chal
lenged the use of the ostrich instruction. 58 The court of appeals up
held the district court's use of the instruction. 59
At trial, Diaz argued that while he was personally acquainted
with some of the members of the conspiracy, he played no part in the
group's illegal activities. 60 Thus, Diaz argued not that he was ignorant
of some or all of the conspirators' activities, but that he was not a
member of the conspiracy at all. He did not testify, but introduced
evidence of various types to support his contention.61 Diaz presented
witnesses who stated that he was visiting friends in the area. 62 He
The evidence showed that Perez asked Rodriguez for help in getting started in the drug
business, and Rodriguez arranged a meeting between hintself, Perez and Reynaldo Diaz,
who agreed to supply Perez with drugs. On August 21, 1987 and September 3,1987, Perez
. sold cocaine to DEA Agent Patricia Collins. Subsequently, Collins arranged to purchase a
kilogram of cocaine from the conspiracy on September 9, 1987. Reynaldo Diaz was not
present at the scheduled time and location of this sale, but phone records demonstrated
that the others called and spoke with him. Soon after the call to Diaz, Peirallo arrived with
the cocaine and Diaz arrived separately. Collins was an hour late, and Peirallo left the
scene, asking to be paged when Collins arrived. Collins appeared soon after PeiraIlo left,
and phone records indicated another call was made to Diaz. Perez went to Collins' caT to
await Peira1lo, and soon thereafter Diaz sent Rodriguez to inform Collins that Peira1lo had
arrived. Once all of the parties to the sale were present, the cars were lined up in this order:
Peira1lo's, then Diaz's and fina1ly Collins'. Diaz then raised the hood of his car. Perez
went to Peirallo's car to get the drugs, and Peirallo told Perez that he had a gun and
intended to use it if necessary. During this conversation, Diaz and Rodriguez stood outside
Diaz's car and watched Collins. Once Perez brought the drugs to Collins, she signaIled for
the arrest. Id. at 545-46.
53. Id. at 546.
54. [d.
55. [d.
56. [d. at 545-46.
57. Id. at 546.
58. [d. at 545, 549. Diaz also questioned whether PeiraIlo's use of a firearm was
properly imputed to Diaz. The court found that the imputation was proper. Id. at 547-49.
59. [d. at 550-51.
60. [d. at 546.
61. [d. at 546-47.
62. [d. at 546.
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claimed that the hood of his car was raised because he was experienc
ing engine trouble, and that this was the reason for his presence at the
scene of the arrest. 63 Diaz stated, through counsel, that he had called
a mechanic, and the mechanic testified that Diaz had called him. 64
However, phone records did not support this claim.6s Before the
judge gave his instructions to the jury, Diaz objected to the ostrich
instruction that the government had submitted. 66 The district court
allowed the instruction, and Diaz was subsequently convicted. On ap
peal, Diaz again raised his objection to the instruction.
Diaz argued that the ostrich instruction was inappropriately used
in his case. 67 The precise nature of his objection is not clear from the
opinion of the court of appeals, but apparently Diaz argued that the
facts did not support an inference of deliberate avoidance of knowl
edge. 68 Rather, he argued, the facts could support two interpreta
tions--either Diaz actually and directly knew of the conspiracy or he
had no knowledge of it.69 The court, citing precedent in the Seventh
Circuit70 and expressly disapproving of a holding in a similar Second
Circuit case,71 held that the instruction was applicable to conspiracy
cases, and that it was properly given in Diaz's case. 72
Thus, after Diaz, the Seventh Circuit has allowed the use of the
ostrich instruction in connection with proof of the defendant's mem
bership in a conspiracy.
B. A Restrictive Approach: United States v. Mankani 73
The defendants in Mankani were charged with conspiracy to pos
Id. at 546-47. The prosecution argued that the raised hood duplicated a "stan
dard method by which drug dealers prevent their buyers from seeing the supplier of the
drugs." Id. at 546.
64. Id. at 547.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 549.
68. See id. at 550-51. The court focused on the facts of Diaz as compared with those
of other cases in which they had allowed the ostrich instruction. Also, the court cited
evidence which supported the inference of deliberate ignorance in Diaz's case: his presence
at the scene of the fourth sale, his raising the hood of his car, which aided the sale, and his
absence from the other transactions. Id. at 551.
69. Id. at 550-51.
70. Id. (citing United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1986».
71. Id. at 549 (citing United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1984».
72. Id. at 551.
73. 738 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1984). Because the defendants in Mankani were tried
before the bench, no jury instructions were given. However, the prosecution applied the
conscious avoidance theory to one of the defendants in Mankani, and the court used that
theory to convict that defendant. Id. at 547.
63.
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sess and distribute marijuana. Nine individuals were charged with in
volvement at several levels with various aspects of the conspiracy.74
The district court applied the conscious avoidance theory to only one
defendant, Sally Edith.7s
After receiving notice of the conspiracy's drug smuggling enter
prise, the DEA began surveillance. 76 A DEA agent went to the hotel
where Mankani and Hamirani were staying, and was able to conduct
aural surveillance through a hole in the wall. 77 One of the officers
conducting the aural surveillance testified that at one point Mankani
complained that six people were extracting the hashish, and that he
would have to pay all of them.78 If six people were working, Edith
must have been one of them, since there were only five others, Mac
Farlane, Sturgeon, Fortin, Raxlen and Norris, present at the barn.
The officer also testified that Mankani complained of "a girl hanging
around."79
While the aural surveillance continued, another agent placed a
tracking device on MacFarlane's car, and the police later followed
74. [d. at 540-41. The defendants were Mohan Mankani, Kenneth Norris, Joseph
Fortin, Peter MacFarlane, Gilles Stanton, William Sturgeon, Harold Raxlen, Nizarali
Hamirani and Sally Edith.
75. Id. at 547. The facts of Mankani involve several defendants, and a long chain of
activities. The Royal Canadian Mounted Police ("RCMP") first suspected two of the con
spirators, Canadians MacFarlane and Stanton, of planning to import hashish into Canada.
The RCMP began close observation of the two men in late spring of 1982, and obtained a
court order to monitor the phone calls of the two. During the summer of 1982, nearly two
tons of hashish arrived in Houston, Texas from India, contained in eight seven-foot-long
steel tubes, weighing approximately 500 pounds each. These tubes were subsequently flown
to John F. Kennedy International Airport on a commercial freight carrier. Several of the
conspirators were waiting for the tubes, but Edith was not among them. On Wednesday,
September 8, MacFarlane picked up the tubes at a warehouse. He had rented a forklift,
and used it to load the tubes into a truck, also rented. MacFarlane then drove the truck to
a small farm in Bakersfield, Vermont, where Edith and her boyfriend, defendant Joseph
Fortin, lived. Edith and Fortin rented the house on the farm; Fortin also rented a portion
of the small bam as a potting studio. Fortin had rented several pieces of heavy equipment
to be used to open the tubeS. Two other defendants, Kenneth Norris and Harold Raxlen,
arrived with a hydraulic press to aid in the opening of the tubes. Another defendant, Wil
liam Sturgeon, also assisted in removing the hashish from the tubes. Edith did not go to
her regular job the day after MacFarlane arrived. On September 10, two other conspira
tors, Mohan Mankani and Nizarali Hamirani, flew to Burlington, Vermont and checked
into a hotel. Mankani then called Stanton. The RCMP intercepted this call and notified
the DEA and the Vermont State Police. This call led to the surveillance which in tum led
to the arrests. Id. at 541-42; Brief for Appellant at 3-20, Mankani (No. 83-1303).
76. Mankani, 738 F.2d at 541.
77. [d.
78. Brief for Appellant at 17, Mankani (No. 83-1303).
79. Id.
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MacFarlane by car and helicopter to the Bakersfield farm.80 The
agent and police conducted visual surveillance of the house and
bam. 81 At trial, one of the officers who had conducted the surveil
lance of the house testified that Edith had gone out to the mailbox,
gone back to the house, reemerged in a bathing suit, gone for a short
swim in a pond on the farm property, then returned to the house. 82
This agent also stated that during his entire surveillance, while he was
stationed 150 yards from the barn, he could hear the loud grinding
noise produced by the tools the defendants were using to extract the
hashish from its containers. 83 The house Edith shared with Fortin
was forty feet from the bam. 84 The DEA later sought and obtained a
search warrant for the house and bam, which authorized a search for
"hashish, invoice records, proceeds, processing tools, and other docu
mentary evidence of the illegal drug operation."8s The DEA executed
the warrant on September 14, seized evidence and arrested Edith,
Sturgeon, Norris, Raxlen, and MacFarlane. 86 Fortin later responded
to a summons, and Mankani was arrested at the hotel. 87
Sally Edith challenged the sufficiency of the evidence against her,
and argued that the government had not proved her guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. 88 The district court judge, acting as trier of fact,
found her guilty of conspiracy.89 The prosecution attempted to prove
Edith's participation in the conspiracy on the basis of eight pieces of
circumstantial evidence. 90 The evidence included: first, that Edith
was one of the two renters of the house; second, that she lived with
Fortin; third, that she missed work the day after MacFarlane arrived
with the hashish; fourth, that on the same day, Fortin leased the
equipment to open the tubes which contained the hashish; fifth, that
agents saw Edith in the house during the opening of the tubes; sixth,
that the agent stationed 150 yards from the bam heard the noise from
80. Mankani, 738 F.2d at 542.
81. [d.
82. Brief for Appellant at 20, Mankani (No. 83-1303).
83. [d. at 17-18.
84. [d.
85. United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 542 (2d Cir. 1984).
86. [d.
87. [d.
88. [d. In addition to Edith's challenge, Mankani and MacFarlane challenged the
aural surveillance of the hotel room, arguing that it constituted an unreasonable search in
violation of the fourth amendment. All of the defendants challenged the search warrant for
the bam, claiming that it was issued without a showing of probable cause, but only Fortin
had standing to raise this challenge. Both challenges failed. Id. at 545-46.
89. [d. at 540-41.
90. [d. at 546-47.
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the machinery, so Edith must have heard it while she was in the house,
on1y 40 yards from the barn; seventh, that Edith wa1ked to the
mailbox and back to the house, thereby coming even closer to the
barn; and eighth, that she later took a short swim and proceeded back
to the house, again passing close to the bam. 91 The government ar
gued on appeal, and apparently at trial as well, that this evidence
either established Edith's participation in the conspiracy or at least
proved that she consciously avoided knowledge of the conspiracy.92
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found the evidence insuf
ficient to prove Edith's participation in the conspiracy.93 The court
also stated that the conscious avoidance theory was inappropriate:
"This [conscious avoidance] argument is totally illogical. How can a
person consciously avoid participating in a conspiracy and also be a
member of the conspiracy? The two notions are obviously mutually
exclusive."94 The court also noted that the conscious avoidance in
struction is only appropriate where the "essential mental element of
the crime is 'guilty knowledge.' "95 Finally, the court stated that the
required mental state for conspiracy is intent. 96 For these reasons, the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the government had im
properly applied the deliberate ignorance theory to Edith. Since the
Mankani decision, the Second Circuit has clarified its position, and
stated that the conscious avoidance theory, and instructions based
upon that theory, cannot be used to prove that a defendant was a
member of a conspiracy. 97
91. Id.
92. Id. The government must have made the conscious avoidance argument at the
bench trial, because it could not have raised the argument for the first time on appeal.
93. Id. at 547.
94. Id. (emphasis in original).
95. Id. at 547 n.l (citing United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
426 U.S. 951 (1976»; United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
821 (1973); United States v. Squires, 440 F.2d 859 (2d Cir. 1971).
96. Mankani, 738 F.2d at 547 n.l (citing United States v. Soto, 716 F.2d 989 (2d Cir.
1983), and W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW § 61 (2d ed. 1972».
97. United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1021 (2d Cir.) (ostrich instruction per
missible if the defendant claims lack of knowledge of specific illegal acts of conspiracy),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861 (1986); United States V. Reed, 790 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.) (os
trich instruction permissible if the defendant claims lack of knowledge of specific illegal
acts of conspiracy), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 954 (1986). However, the Supreme Court has
also clarified the standards for the use of coconspirator's hearsay evidence, such that, if
Mankani were heard today, the evidence against Edith would be admitted. See Bourjaily V.
United States, 483 U.S. 171, 181 (1987) (such evidence admissible under preponderance
standard, and judge not bound by any of the Federal Rules of Evidence other than privilege
in making his or her determination of admissibility). Under Bourjaily, the government
cannot be required to prove a conspirator's participation in the conspiracy by a preponder
. ance of the nonhearsay evidence before hearsay statements of coconspirators are admitted.
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Other Cases Decided Under the Two Approaches

Three other cases decided under the two approaches to deliberate
ignorance in conspiracy cases highlight the precise differences between
them. In some types of conspiracy cases, the Seventh and Second Cir
cuits agree that the instruction should be allowed. The circuits' pri
mary disagreement is over the use of the deliberate ignorance theory in
proving a defendant's membership in a conspiracy.
The Second Circuit clarified its position on the use of the con
scious avoidance instruction in two cases that came before it after
Mankani: United States v. Reed 98 and United States v. Lanza. 99 In
Reed, the defendant was involved in a conspiracy to ship protective
garments for use in chemical warfare to Iran in violation of a statutory
embargo. 1OO The defendant argued that he was involved with the ex
port scheme but did not know that the destination of the garments was
Iran. 101 Relying on Mankani, Reed argued on appeal that the ostrich
instruction given at his trial was reversible error. 102 The court held
that the reasoning in Mankani prohibited the use of the ostrich in
struction only in cases where the defendant's membership in the con
spiracy is at issue. 103 In Reed, where the defendant conceded
membership in the conspiracy, the court held that the ostrich instruc
tion was proper. 104
The defendant in United States v. Lanza was accused of conspir
acy to commit wire fraud. lOS The defendant argued, similarly to the
defendant in Reed, that while he was involved in the group's activities,
he believed that he was helping to commit extortion, not wire fraud. 106
On appeal, he similarly attacked the ostrich instruction given at his
trial, arguing that it could not be used in conspiracy cases.107 Again,
the court held that the Mankani approach only forbids the ostrich
Thus, the hearsay statements offered against Edith would be admissible if a preponderance
of the evidence showed that the statements themselves met the requirements of the cocon
spirator's exception to the hearsay rule, regardless of the other evidence offered. The hold
ing in Bourjai/y has no effect on the Second Circuit's approach to the deliberate ignorance
issue in conspiracy cases, but more of the evidence against her would have been admissible.
98. 790 F.2d 208 (2d Cir.), cerro denied, 479 U.S. 954 (1986).
99. 790 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861 (1986).
100. Reed, 790 F.2d at 209.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 211.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. United States V. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1017 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861
(1986).
106. Id. at 1018.
107. Id. at 1020.
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instruction in conspiracy cases if the defendant's membership in the
conspiracy is in dispute. 108 The court held that once a defendant ad
mits his involvement with the conspiring group, as the defendant did
in Lanza, the ostrich instruction is appropriate if the defendant claims
ignorance of specific acts of the conspiracy.l09 Thus, in both cases the
Second Circuit held that once the government had proved member
ship in the conspiracy by actual intent, the ostrich instruction may be
given in connection with the defendant's knowledge of specific crimi
nal acts of the enterprise. 110 However, the Second Circuit Court of
Appeals preserved the distinction between membership and specific
acts, and stated that the conscious avoidance instruction cannot be
given in connection with proof of membership in a conspiracy.lll
After the Second Circuit's decision in Mankani, a defendant in
United States v. Kehm,112 a conspiracy case in the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals, attempted to use the reasoning in Mankani to object
to an ostrich instruction which had been given in his case. 113 How
ever, the defendant in Kehm did not claim that he was not a member
of the conspiracy. In fact, he admitted that he was involved in some
way with the activities of those charged with conspiracy.1l4 Rather,
he argued, and brought evidence that tended to show, that he did not
know of the conspiracy's drug smuggling operation. lIS The court re
jected the defendant's argument, which was based on Mankani, and
stated of the reasoning in Mankani itself: "[T]he point is unexception
able; one cannot be a conspirator yet consciously avoid being a con
spirator. To avoid being a conspirator is to be innocent of conspiracy.
But this is not how an ostrich instruction is used in conspiracy
cases."1l6 The court noted that the defendant in Kehm, Steven Green
berg, had actually helped to set up the corporation through which the
108. Id. af 1022.
Id. at 1022-23.
110. United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861
(1986); United States v. Reed, 790 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 954
(1986).
Ill. Lanza, 790 F.2d at 1015; Reed, 790 F.2d at 211. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit has recently followed this approach in a case involving the crime of knowingly
renting property for the purpose of unlawfully storing, distributing and using a controlled
substance. United States v. Chen, 913 F.2d 183, 186 (5th Cir. 1990). In Chen, the Fifth
Circuit invalidated the defendant's conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(I), a crime with an
explicit mens rea of intent, because the district court gave a deliberate ignorance (ostrich)
instruction without a further instruction on mens rea. Id. at 190-91.
112. 799 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1986).
113. Id. at 362.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
109.
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conspiracy later engaged in the smuggling. 117 A coconspirator testi
fied that Greenberg left one of the group's meetings when a discussion
of the use of the plane began, and stated that "he didn't want to hear
about it."118 The court cited this and other facts as indicative of
Greenberg'S probable deliberate ignorance, and upheld the trial
judge's use of the ostrich instruction. 119
The court could have upheld the instruction and still recognized
the Second Circuit's distinction between the defenses of nonmember
ship and ignorance of specific acts. Greenberg's defense went only to
specific acts. Thus, even the Second Circuit would have allowed the
ostrich instruction in Kehm. Instead, the court in Kehm chose lan
guage that made it unclear whether it accepted the distinction: "We
have sustained conspiracy convictions in cases in which ostrich in
structions were given and we hold that in a conspiracy prosecution it
is permissible to give an ostrich instruction as part of the definition of
knowledge ...."120 In using this language, the Seventh Circuit did
not clearly state whether it accepted the Second Circuit's distinction
between proof of knowledge of specific acts once membership has been
proved, and proof of membership itself. The Seventh Circuit's subse
quent decision in Diaz relied on the ambiguous holding in Kehm.l2l
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND AND SEVENTH CIRCUIT
ApPROACHES, AND PROPOSAL FOR AN ALTERNATIVE

The main purpose of equating deliberate ignorance with knowl
edge, and of giving a jury instruction based on this equation, is to pre
vent a guilty defendant from escaping punishment by avoiding
knowledge of one or two key facts.122 The notion behind the theory is
that the defendant is in fact guilty, and his ability to determine which
knowledge to avoid demonstrates that he in fact did possess the re
quired knowledge. 123 The key question, which the Second and Sev
enth Circuits answer differently, is whether this notion makes sense in
a case where the accused defends against a charge of conspiracy by
claiming he was not a member of the conspiracy. The Second Circuit
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id. (citations omitted).
121. United States'v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544,550 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
2075 (1989).
122. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 commentary passim (1985); see also Robbins,
supra note 22, at 196-98. Robbins ultimately concludes that deliberate ignorance should be
viewed as the equivalent of recklessness, not knowledge. Id. at 231-34.
123. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 2,02 commentary passim (1985).
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allows the use of the ostrich instruction in conspiracy cases only if
membership can be independently established. 124 The Seventh Circuit
allows the ostrich instruction in connection with membership or spe
cific acts of the conspiracy, and does not require independent proof of
a defendant's membership.12s It is this difference that must be
analyzed.
A.

The Ostrich Instruction and the Mens Rea for Conspiracy

The ostrich instruction equates deliberate ignorance with knowl
edge. 126 Thus, an ostrich instruction that requires no proof of mental
state beyond conscious avoidance should only be used in connection
with crimes for which the required mental state is knowledge or some
lesser mens rea. When the crime charged requires that the prosecu
tion prove that the defendant acted with a specific purpose, a care
lessly worded ostrich instruction may give the jury the impression that
the defendant's willful blindness establishes not only his guilty knowl
edge, but his purpose as well. Therefore, although the instruction may
be relevant to proof of guilt of a crime which requires a mental state
greater than knowledge, it should never be given in connection with
such a crime without a clear explanation that such knowledge alone is
not enough to convict the defendant. 127
A concrete example will help to demonstrate the distinction be
tween the two levels of mens rea. Suppose the defendant is charged
with receiving stolen property under the Model Penal Code, which
provides that a person is guilty of this crime if he "purposely receives
. . . movable property of another knowing that it has been stolen, or
believing that it has probably been stolen."128 His defense is that he
did not know or believe that the property was stolen. Under the
124. See United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1022 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S.
861 (1986); United States v. Reed, 790 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 954
(1986); United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 547 (2d. Cir. 1984).
125. Diaz, 864 F.2d at 551; United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354, 362 (7th Cir.
1986).
126. See supra notes 22-37 and accompanying text.
127. Proof of a defendant's knowledge or deliberate ignorance does have evidentiary
value even if the prosecution must also prove that the defendant acted intentionally. If the
prosecution shows that a defendant had knowledge or the equivalent of knowledge of the
conspiracy, it becomes more likely that the defendant was involved with the conspiracy and
intended to further it. This meets the standard of relevancy required by the Federal Rules
of Evidence, which provide: .. 'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action
more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401
(emphasis added).
128. MODEL PENAL CoDE § 223.6 (1985).
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M.P.C.'s definition of receiving stolen property, the defendant in this
example has conceded that he received the property and does not
claim that he did so accidentally. Thus, he has conceded that he acted
purposely. Only the defendant's knowledge is at issue. If the prosecu
tor can prove that the defendant in fact knew that the property he
received was stolen, his defense is negated, and he must be found
guilty. In this context, the ostrich instruction is a powerful and legiti
mate weapon for the prosecutor: the defendant claims that he didn't
know the property was stolen; the prosecutor demonstrates that the
defendant deliberately avoided finding out certain facts, for example,
the source of the goods, that would have led the defendant to the
knowledge that the goods were stolen. If one accepts the equating of
deliberate ignorance with knowledge, the defendant is guilty. His only
defense is his lack of knowledge; and the prosecutor has proved that
the defendant possessed the equivalent of that knowledge. The ostrich
instruction is designed to prevent a defendant in this type of case from
avoiding liability.
Now, suppose that the defendant is charged with arson under the
M.P.C. in connection with the destruction of a building. The statute
provides that a person is guilty of arson "if he starts a fire or causes an
explosion with the purpose of . . . destroying a building or occupied
structure of another." 129 His defense is that he did not intend to de
stroy the building. In this case, proof that the defendant knew that his
conduct would lead to the destruction of the building does not prove
him guilty of arson in the absence of proof of a purpose to destroy the
building. To give the ostrich instruction in this case without any other
instruction on mens rea could lead a jury to the erroneous conclusion
that the defendant's deliberate ignorance about the fact that his con
duct would destroy the building also establishes that the defendant
intended to destroy the building. Proof of knowledge or its equivalent
should not be enough to convict this defendant of arson under the
M.P.C.
Similarly, in a conspiracy case, the appropriateness of the ostrich
instruction depends on the level of mens rea the government is re
quired to prove and the defense offered. Therefore, a court must de
termine the required mental state for conspiracy before deciding
whether, and in what form, to give the ostrich instruction.
The statutory scheme under which Diaz and Edith were charged
provides no clear indication of the requisite mental state. 130 Thus, the
129.
130.

MODEL PENAL CoDE § 220. 1(a) (1985).
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 § 406 (codi
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matter is left to the courts, and arguably, knowledge could be the mens
rea under the statute. Many authorities, however, agree that intent is
the requisite state of mind for conspiracy, at least for entrance into the
agreement. 131 The lack of an explicit mens rea in the statute under
which Diaz was charged gives apparent judicial discretion on a matter
that is, in fact, fairly settled. 132
While the majority of authorities and jurisdictions have found
that the mens rea for conspiracy is purpose or intent, it is difficult to
determine exactly what this means in the context of a crime that may
involve no overt acts other than entrance into an agreement. The Diaz
decision raises a crucial question: the importance of the alleged con
spirator's knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy in proving that
the defendant had the requisite mens rea. In analyzing this problem, it
is helpful to break the mens rea for conspiracy into two constituent
elements: knowledge to the existen~ of the conspiracy and its illegal
objectives and a purpose to further that conspiracy's objectives. 133
This approach merely points out the obvious: a defendant must know
of the conspiracy and its illegal objectives if he or she intends to fur
ther these objectives. If the prosecution proves that the defendant
joined the conspiracy with the purpose of furthering its aims, the pros
ecution has also proven the defendant's knowledge of the conspiracy.
However, if only the defendant's knowledge of the conspiracy is estab
lished, the prosecution must still prove that the defendant acted with
the purpose of furthering the objectives of the conspiracy.
Under the two part approach to the mens rea for conspiracy, the
potential problem with the use of the ostrich instruction in these cases
becomes clearer.· In cases in which the defendant argues only that he
or she did not know of the conspiracy's unlawful activities, the in
struction is proper, without elaboration. Only the defendant's knowl
edge is at issue. But, in cases such as Diaz, the defendant argues that
he or she had no connection, legal or illegal, with the conspiracy. In
such cases, the defendant's knowledge of the existence of the conspir
acy and its aims is merely evidence which tends to discredit his or her
defense. The defendant's knowledge makes it more likely that he or
fled as amended at 21 u.s.c. § 846 (1988» provides: "Any person who attempts or con
spires to commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same
penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the
attempt or conspiracy."
131. See supra notes 38-45 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 37-45, 121 and accompanying text.
133. This approach is suggested in Harno, supra note 41, at 633, and in the Model
Penal Code commentaries. See MODEL PENAL CoDE § 5.03 commentary at 405 (1985).
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she was involved in the conspiracy and intended to further it. Such
knowledge can support an inference that the defendant must have
been involved in some way with the members of the conspiracy in or
der to acquire the knowledge. 134 However, this knowledge is not
equivalent to an intent to further the aims of the conspiracy. Giving
an ostrich instruction in this type of case could have the effect of de
priving the defendant of his or her non-involvement defense, unless the
court also gives a cautionary instruction that the prosecution must
also prove the defendant's intent to further the conspiracy.
The Second and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals have re- 
sponded very differently to this potential problem. In Mankani, the
Second Circuit explicitly stated that the mens rea for conspiracy is
intent, and disallowed the conscious avoidance theory in cases where
the defendant raised the non-involvement defense. 13s The Seventh
Circuit allowed the ostrich instruction in Diaz, but without ever ex
plicitly considering the question of mens rea. The Diaz court also did
not acknowledge that giving an ostrich instruction, without a further
cautionary instruction on mens rea, could allow a conviction for con
spiracy even when the government failed to prove that the defendant
had the requisite intent to further the conspiracy.136 In this situation
there are two issues: the defendant's knowledge of the acts of the con
spiracy and his or her intent to further the conspiracy. The ostrich
instruction, used injudiciously, tends to collapse the two issues, and
this collapsing, in turn, could have the effect of depriving the defend
ant of a legitimate defense. The Second Circuit approach recognizes
this concern; the Seventh Circuit does not make the connection be
tween the mens rea for conspiracy and the appropriateness of the os
trich instruction.
In Diaz, the Seventh Circuit seems to equate the defense of non
membership with a defense of lack of knowledge of the conspiracy's
activities. 137 As justification for upholding the use of the instruction,
the court states:
Here, the trial record contained ample evidence to support the infer
ence that the defendant's modus operandi was to insulate himself
from the actual drug transaction so that he could deny knowledge
of it. During the other observed transactions, he had absented him
self from the scene. On this occasion, [the final sale to DEA Agent
134. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
135. United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 547 n.l (2d Cir. 1984).
136. United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
2075 (1989).
137. Id. at 55l.
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Collins, at which the arrests took place] while [the defendant was]
present, he argued that he was preoccupied with his disabled vehicle
and did not know that he was standing in the middle of his friends'
drug transaction. 138

The only evidence of Diaz's involvement in the prior sales was based
On the testimony of his coconspirators, admitted under the coconspira
tors' exception to the hearsay rule. 139 None of the evidence cited by
the court speaks directly to Diaz's defense, which was that he was not
a member of the conspiracy at all. 14O The jury could choose to believe
either Diaz's version of events or that of the government's witnesses;
One account must have been false. Diaz's defense-that he was not a
member of the conspiracy-only makes sense if the jury believed his
version of these events. That is, that he was completely uninvolved in
the first three sales, and was on the scene of the fourth only because of
car trouble. 141 If the jury believed Diaz, they believed that he was an
innocent bystander to the conspiracy. Arguably, the ostrich instruc
tion makes some sense under this scenario, because an inference of
deliberate ignorance could cast doubt on Diaz's story. A jury could
find that Diaz's ability to avoid learning of certain facts indicated a
familiarity with the conspiracy's activities. This familiarity, in turn,
may make it more probable that Diaz was a member of the conspiracy.
Without a further instruction indicating that deliberate ignorance
alone is not enough to prove the defendant guilty, however, the ostrich
instruction may have the effect of negating Diaz's defense. That is, the
jury may find that Diaz deliberately avoided learning about the COn
spiracy and find him guilty based On this equivalent of knowledge
alone. The jury might not understand the need to find that Diaz in
tended to further the conspiracy.142
However, if the jury believed the version of events given by the
coconspirators, Diaz had nO defense; he was not only a member of the
conspiracy, he was One of its leaders, and had actual knowledge of the
conspiracy resulting from his participation in the conspiracy. Under
the coconspirators' version of events, Diaz's defense is a lie, and the
ostrich instruction is both unnecessary and nonsensical. 143 Thus, Diaz
138. Id.
139. Id. at 545-46.
140. Id. at 550-51.
141. Id.
142. See supra note III and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fifth Circuit's
approach to this problem in another context.
143. United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 550-51 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 2075 (1989).
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argued on appeal that neither his version of events nor that of the
government's witnesses supported an inference that he deliberately
avoided knowledge of the conspiracy.1 44 Under the two versions of
events offered to the jury, Diaz had either actual knowledge or no
knowledge. The ostrich instruction, given without further clarifica
tion, is inappropriate under either scenario.
In upholding the instruction in spite of Diaz's defense of non
membership, the Seventh Circuit allowed the instruction in a case
which is more similar to Mankani than to Kehm. In Kehm, the court
allowed an ostrich instruction in a conspiracy case in which the de
fendant claimed that he was ignorant only of the conspiracy's criminal
activities. 14s Unlike Diaz, the defendant in Kehm never argued that he
was completely uninvolved with the alleged conspirators and their ac
tivities. In allowing the use of the ostrich instruction in Diaz, the Sev
enth Circuit went beyond the holding in Kehm, without
acknowledging that it had done SO.146
Looking at the probable result in Mankani had it been decided
under the Seventh Circuit approach makes it easier to see the dangers
involved in careless use of the ostrich instruction in conspiracy
cases. 147 The jury would have heard the evidence of Edith's proximity
to the sounds of the illegal activity in the barn, the fact that she lived
with one of the conspirators and a description of her behavior on the
day of the arrests. 148 Then, the judge would have given the ostrich
instruction, thereby telling the jury that if they found that Edith had
deliberately shut her eyes to certain facts for fear of what she would
learn, she in fact knew of the conspiracy. If this was the extent of the
charge on mens rea, Edith could have been found guilty of conspiracy
on evidence that established nothing more than her proximity to a
conspiracy. In order to safeguard against such results, the Second Cir
cuit forbids the use of the instruction altogether in conspiracy prosecu
tions in which the defendant's membership in the conspiracy is at
lssue.
Yet in doing so, the court perhaps goes too far. It protects a de
fendant's right to raise the defense of nonmembership, but undervalues
the potential that a finding of deliberate ignorance has for damaging
144. Id.
145. United States v. Kehm, 799 F.2d 354 (7th Cir. 1986). See supra notes 112-121
and accompanying text for a discussion of Kehm.
146. Diaz, 864 F.2d at 551.
147. For a discussion of Mankani, see supra notes 73-97 and accompanying text.
148. For a description of the circumstantial evidence against Edith in Mankani, see
supra notes 90-92 and accompanying text.
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the credibility of the defense of nonmembership in the conspiracy.
The court thereby undervalues the significant policy concerns that un
derlie conspiracy law.
Thus, the Seventh Circuit errs on the prosecution's side, and does
not closely examine the use of the ostrich instruction in Diaz. On the
other hand, the Second Circuit errs on the side of the defendant, and
forbids the use of the instruction altogether in cases like Mankani.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals thereby deprives the prosecution
of a useful tool. Rather than balancing the two concerns at issue, each
court chooses an all-or-nothing approach.

B. Analysis of the Two Competing Concerns: Dangers to Society
from Conspiracy and Confusion Caused by the Ostrich
Instruction
A defendant can be punished under conspiracy law although his
or her crime is still in the planning stage. This punishment is justified
by the unusual danger to society which group behavior presents. 149
These dangers include greater likelihood of success, the ability to carry
out more complex illegal acts, the increased likelihood of repeat of
fenses and patterns of crime, and other dangers. ISO In part because of
these dangers, the prosecutor in a conspiracy case has several advan
tages not normally present in a criminal trial. First, conspiracy stat
utes are often quite vague, and allow for a great deal of latitude in
what a prosecutor must prove. lSI In addition, the coconspirator ex
ception to the hearsay rule allows the prosecutor to put statements by
one conspirator into evidence against all parties to the conspiracy.ls2
The courts have construed the exception broadly, thereby increasing
the prosecutor's advantage. IS3 Thus, evidence that would be inadmis
sible in a prosecution for a substantive criminal offense is admissible in
conspiracy cases. Several other prosecutorial advantages, less directly
relevant to the use of the ostrich instruction, also obtain in conspiracy
trials. IS4 In light of these advantages, perhaps the dangers of conspir
149. See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961).
150. Id. at 594-95.
151. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOlT, supra note 38, § 6.4(b)(1).
152. Id. § 6.4(b)(3) (citing J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1079, (1972».
153. See W. LAFAVE & A. SCOlT, supra note 38, § 6.4(b)(3).
154. The prosecutor has the right to try all conspirators in any district where any
one of them committed any overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Hyde & Schneider
v. United States, 225 U.S. 347, 355-57 (1912). Also, courts have allowed conspiracy con
victions based upon circumstantial evidence, even if only loosely relevant. w. LAFAVE &
A. SCOlT, supra note 38, § 6.4(b)(4) (citing several cases in which such evidence is admit
ted under the rationale that more direct proof of conspiracy is difficult to obtain, e.g.,
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acy are adequately addressed, and there is no need for the expansive
use of the ostrich instruction typified by Diaz.
Still, since the leaders of conspiracies often create elaborate net
works of assistants in order to limit the leaders' criminal liability, the
ostrich instruction may be an important and useful prosecutorial tool
even in a case like Diaz or Mankani. A defendant's deliberate igno
rance, and the inference of knowledge that it supports, can cast doubt
on his or her claim that he or she was not involved in the conspiracy.
Yet the use of the ostrich instruction in cases where the defend
ant's membership in the conspiracy is at issue is arguably inconsistent
with the mens rea for conspiracy: intent to further the conspiracy's
objectives. ISS Because the deliberate ignorance instruction can ulti
mately be traced to Model Penal Code section 2.02(7), one authority
for evaluating the appropriateness of the instruction in conspiracy
cases is the M.P.C.'s conspiracy statute. 1S6 The drafters ofthis statute
clearly required a mental state greater than knowledge for proof of
conspiracy, "with the purpose of promoting or facilitating [the planned
crime's] commission."ls7 Thus, the M.P.C. requires that the defend
ant enter into the agreement to conspire with the purpose of furthering
the criminal act which is the focus of the conspiracy. ISS Section
2.02(7), the basis for the deliberate ignorance theory of liability, ap
plies to crimes for which knowledge is the requisite mental state. 1S9
Guilty knowledge is relevant to extending the conspirator's guilt to
acts committed by coconspirators on behalf of the conspiracy, but only
after the defendant's purposeful agreement to conspire has been estab
lished. l60 Thus, the drafters of the M.P.C. never intended 'that the
deliberate ignorance theory be applied to membership in a conspiracy,
because under the M.P.C., a defendant must enter into the agreement
purposely. 161
------------------------------------------------------ I
United States v. Garelle, 438 F.2d 366 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. dismissed, 401 U.S. 967 (1971);
Nye & Nissen v. United States, 168 F.2d 846 (9th Cir. 1948), aff'd, 336 U.S. 613 (1949».
The prosecution may try all coconspirators together, and deprive the defendants of their
right to separate trials. W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, supra note 38, § 6.4(b)(5). Thejustifica
tion for the joint trial is the need to have all defendants present at a single proceeding in
order to establish a clear and complete picture of all steps of the conspiracy. Id. Overall,
the prosecution enjoys unique advantages in conspiracy trials.
155. See supra notes 38-46 and accompanying text.
156. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (1985). See supra text accompanying note 40 for
the text of § 5.03(1).
157. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (1985) (emphasis added).
158. Id.
159. Id. § 2.02(7). See supra note 21 for the text of § 2.02(7).
160. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(2), (3) (1985).
161. Id. § 5.03(1).
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A close reading of the Model Penal Code, then, supports the Sec
ond Circuit approach. First, the M.P.C.'s conspiracy statute 162 states
that the mens rea for the agreement, the act of conspiracy, is purpose.
This is equivalent to the mental state the Second Circuit requires, in
tent. 163 Second, the statute as a whole makes a distinction between the
initial agreement, which the defendant must enter into purposely, and
the defendant's liability for acts undertaken by the conspiracy once he
or she has joined it, which may be proved by knowledge. 164 The Sec
ond Circuit makes the same distinction in Reed 165 and Lanza,166 al
lowing the ostrich instruction in connection with knowledge of specific
acts of the conspiracy once the defendant's intentional membership in
the conspiracy is established. 167
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit's approach is, at best, uncon
cerned with the mens rea issue. The Diaz court never explicitly con
fronts the question of whether the mens rea for conspiracy is
knowledge or intent. The court ignores the issue, and its potential
implications for the use of the ostrich instruction, focusing instead on
the dangers to society of conspiracy.
Thus, there are two concerns involved in using the ostrich in
struction in conspiracy cases where the defendant's membership is at
issue. The Seventh Circuit chooses to focus on the dangers of conspir
acy; the Second Circuit focuses instead on the inconsistencies between
the mens rea for conspiracy and the ostrich instruction. A better ap
proach would attempt to balance the two interests.
C.

Balancing the Interests: A Cautionary Instruction

The two approaches discussed in the previous section do not at
tempt to balance the competing interests that both courts acknowledge
are present. A cautionary instruction on mens rea, which a judge
would give after the ostrich instruction in conspiracy cases like Diaz
and Mankani, would address both concerns.
The instruction would, in effect, divide the mens rea for conspir
162. Id. § 5.03.
163. United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 547 n.1 (2d Cir. 1984). The Model
Penal Code explicitly equates intent and purpose in its general definitions. MODEL PENAL
CoDE § 1.13(12) (1985).
164. MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1)-(3) (1985).
165. United States v. Reed, 790 F.2d 208, 211 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 954
(1986).
166. United States v. Lanza, 790 F.2d 1015, 1021 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 861
(1986).
167. Lanza, 790 F.2d at 1021; Reed, 790 F.2d at 211.
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acy into two constituent parts. 168 First, the judge would give an os
trich instruction, similar to that given in Diaz:
You may infer knowledge from a combination of suspicion and
indifference to the truth. If you find that a person had a strong
suspicion that things were not what they seemed or that someone
had withheld some important facts, yet shut his eyes for fear of
what he would learn, you may conclude that he acted knowingly
169

Then, to make it clear that knowledge alone does not establish the
defendant's guilt, the judge would give a further instruction, clarifying
the difference between knowledge and intent to further the conspiracy.
The instruction should initially explain the role that knowledge and
intent play in a conspiracy. The instruction should then state clearly
that knowledge and intent, not knowledge alone, are required. Fi
nally, the instruction should specify that deliberate ignorance can be
evidence of intent, but does not on its own establish intent. This in
struction, given after the ostrich instruction above, might be worded as
follows:
However, a finding of knowledge alone is not enough to find the
defendant guilty of conspiracy. The government must also prove
that the defendant acted intentionally. You may find that the de
fendant acted intentionally if you find that he [she] acted with the
conscious objective or desire to help the conspiracy achieve its aims.
You must find both that he [she] knew about the conspiracy and
that he [she] intended to join it and aid it. If you find only that the
defendant knew of the conspiracy, or deliberately avoided learning
of it, you cannot find that he [she] acted intentionally.17o

Such an instruction would allow the prosecution to make use of the
inferences that the jury might draw from the defendant's deliberate
ignorance. But, it would minimize the danger that a defendant would
be convicted of conspiracy without a showing of the requisite intent.
The jury would be instructed that knowledge alone does not establish
guilt. This approach would combine the benefits of both the Second
and the Seventh Circuits' approaches.
168. See supra notes 37-45, 112 and accompanying text.
169. United States v. Diaz, 864 F.2d 544, 549 (7th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
2075 (1989).
170. This instruction is based on MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03(1) (1985). A portion
of the wording is suggested in RICO Cases Committee, Criminal Justice Section of the
American Bar Association, Jury Instructions for Civil and Criminal RICO Cases, 1987
B.Y.U. L. REV. 1.
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CONCLUSION

The ostrich, or conscious avoidance, instruction is an important
weapon in the prosecutor's arsenal. It allows for the conviction of a
criminal who was clever enough to attempt to insulate himself or her
self from liability by avoiding knowledge of certain acts or events.
Nearly all of the federal courts of appeals allow the instruction in
some contexts}'1
The instruction presents special difficulties when used in a con
spiracy case, however, especially when the defendant argues that he or
she was not a member of the conspiracy. The Second Circuit does not
allow the instruction in connection with proof of membership in a con
. spiracy;172 the Seventh Circuit allows it freely.173 The Second Circuit
approach is logically consistent. This approach is also in accord with
the Model Penal Code, which is the source for the conscious avoid
ance theory, and the instructions based upon that theory.174 More im
portantly, the Second Circuit approach is in accord with the common
law, from which federal conspiracy statutes are derived. On the other
hand, it deprives the prosecutor of a valuable tool. The ostrich in
struction is of some use even in cases where the defendant's member
ship is at issue, because the defendant's deliberate ignorance, which is
the equivalent of knowledge, makes it somewhat more likely that he or
she was involved in the conspiracy and did intend to further its aims.
In completely disallowing the instruction in these cases, the Second
.Circuit perhaps goes too far.
If a court gives the instruction in connection with a defense of
nonmembership, that court should take additional precautions that
the jury understands that it must also find that the defendant had the
requisite intent to participate in the conspiracy. Perhaps the best ap
proach here would be a standard, clarifying instruction which would
focus on three issues: the role that knowledge and intent play in con
spiracy, the need to find both knowledge and intent to further the con
spiracy, . and the evidentiary value of deliberate ignorance in
establishing that intent. With this set of instructions, the government
could still make use of evidence that pointed to a defendant's deliber
ate ignorance, and in tum, use that ignorance as evidence of the de
fendant's actual participation in the conspiracy. Nevertheless, the
171. See supra notes 34-36 and accompanying text.
172. United States v. Mankani, 738 F.2d 538, 547 (2d Cir. 1984).
173. Diaz, 864 F.2d at 551.
174. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text.
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clarifying instruction would help ensure that the defendant would not
be convicted without a finding of intent.
Christine L. Chinni

